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During the past two decades we have witnessed a
profound reassessment of public policy towards the
infrastructure sectors in both the advanced industri-
al and developing and transition economies (World
Bank 2004). It is part of a much broader policy
reform movement that is going on all over the world
– the breaking up of centralised planning, privatisa-
tion, regulatory reform and deregulation, and a
renewed reliance on the market mechanism. This
paper presents a brief overview of this massive pol-
icy redirection, with a special focus on the infra-
structure sectors (network utilities) and within the
historical, economic and institutional context of
developing and transition economies.
Deregulation in the US and the EU
The assault on regulation began in the United States
(Joskow and Noll 1994). There were several histori-
cal forces that created the “perfect economic storm”
and propelled the revolutionary deregulation of a
wide variety of economic activities and much of the
country’s public utility industries in the late 1970s
and early 1980s: double-digit inflation, “energy
crises”, stagflation, heightened environmental con-
cerns, the virtual bankruptcy of a backbone industry
(rail), and a perceived erosion of the country’s pro-
ductivity edge and its international competitiveness.
Proponents of deregulation emphasised its potential
to combat inflation and restore the growth in pro-
ductivity by unleashing market forces of competi-
tion. The promise of deregulation to contribute to
the resolution of the country’s macroeconomic
dilemmas had considerable political appeal. More-
over, concerns about the energy crises and environ-
mental protection facilitated the introduction of eco-
nomically efficient pricing that would discourage
wasteful consumption (Kahn 2001).
Roughly during the same period, major sectors of
the British economy also underwent far-reaching
regulatory reform. Deregulation and new methods
of regulation were introduced in the financial ser-
vices and the professions, and radical regulatory
reform accompanied the privatisation of the utility
industries (Newbery 2000). In the process, several
new regulatory institutions were established and
new tasks were given to existing agencies such as
the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (Arm-
strong et al. 1994). In the European Union, a series
of directives beginning in the late 1980s sought to
achieve the ultimate political objective of creating a
single market – an area without internal borders in
which free movement of goods, persons, services,
and capital is ensured. These directives spelled out
common rules for telecommunications, electricity,
natural gas and transportation markets across the
Member States. Taken together, they provided a
roadmap for the development of a common regula-
tory framework and the extensive liberalisation of
these industries. In fact, water is the only EU net-
work utility where liberalisation is still in its infancy.
With the exception of the United States, almost all
other countries in the past have chosen nationali-
sation over regulation as the instrument for control
of monopoly power in the network utilities.1 While
the US deregulatory policy was being implemented
and as the EU directives (which called for exten-
sive liberalisation but remained silent on the issue
of ownership) were building the policy foundation
of a single market, another revolution begun to
sweep the globe – privatisation.
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1 This refers mainly to the period after World War II. For example,
private ownership in electricity was initially the norm in many
countries in Europe and  South America. State ownership spread
later, especially after World War II, either because of ideological
reasons (as in England and France) or because political constraints
on prices forced private firms into bankruptcy (as in Latin
America). Similar situations prevailed for railroads and water in
many countries.Telephone services became captive of state-owned
post offices in Europe and Japan, but not in Canada, or, initially,
Latin America.The privatisation revolution
Since the early 1980s, privatisation has been a key
component of structural reform programs in both
developed and developing and transition econo-
mies. National leaders burdened by sizeable bud-
get deficits and stagnating economies have been
outspoken on the need to foster private initiative
in the interests of productivity and growth, and
have been taking substantive steps to move eco-
nomic activities from governmental to private con-
trol in all sectors, including infrastructure (Willig
1994; Megginson and Netter 2001).
The initial impetus for privatisation in the devel-
oping countries was provided by the debt crises
that emerged in the early 1980s. In many of these
countries, the external sovereign debt problem led
them through a decade of low to negative growth,
macroeconomic instability and a series of forced
adjustments. Developing countries simply could
not continue absorbing the fiscal burden of their
state-owned enterprises. (Lieberman 1997). At the
same time, there was abundant evidence accumu-
lating that the state-owned enterprises in core sec-
tors of their economies, like infrastructure, were
suffering from severe performance problems
(Shirley and Walsh 2001).
State-owned entities were forced to pursue multiple,
poorly-defined and conflicting objectives. They were
frequently used as instruments of stabilisation policy
through price controls and investment targets. Their
management was often appointed on the basis of
political loyalty rather than professionalism,and their
employment and investment patterns reflected
bureaucratic preferences rather than market demand
and supply conditions. Scarce
public investment funds allocated
to the infrastructure sectors were
in many cases squandered
through policies reflecting politi-
cal expediency and other short-
run objectives rather than careful
long-run planning in the public
interest. Moreover, price controls
were imposed in disregard of
their performance implications,
subjecting the operating entities
to considerable financial distress
and substantially impairing their
ability to provide reliable service
(Kerf and Smith 1996).
Attempts at reforming the public enterprises large-
ly failed (World Bank 1995). These efforts either
did not bring the desired results or the improve-
ments were not sustained.Very few governments,if
indeed any, were able to introduce and maintain
the large number of complex and demanding poli-
cy measures needed for efficient public enterprise
performance. In the meantime, the costs of state
ownership were increasing because of dramatic
technological changes, increased globalisation, and
ever increasing scarcity of public funds. In many
countries, inefficient public enterprises, especially
in the infrastructure sectors, were draining the
state budgets, diverting resources from health and
education, undermining the banking sector and
impeding the development of the private sector. In
the context of a globalised economy, the poorly
performing state-owned infrastructure sectors
were increasingly seen as constraining economic
growth and undermining international competiti-
veness. It became evident to policymakers through-
out the world that the long-term solution to the
problems of  poor service delivery,lacklustre growth
and damaging political interference required radi-
cal structural change – privatisation, with the pub-
lic’s role mainly restricted to that of regulation
which seeks to ensure a fair policy development
and recognition of social and other policy goals.
The dimensions of the privatisation revolution in
both the developed and developing and transition
economies (DTEs) has been huge. Between 1990
and 2003 more than $890 billion was invested (in the
form of divestitures, green field projects, and man-
agement and operational contracts with major capi-
tal expenditures) in approximately 2,700 private
infrastructure projects in developing and transition
CESifo DICE Report 1/2005 20
Forum
Figure 1CESifo DICE Report 1/2005 21
Forum
countries alone (Figure 1). However, annual invest-
ment flows peaked at around $130 billion in 1997
and have since dropped by more than half – for
example, investment totalled $47.5 billion in 2002,
falling back to 1994 levels (Izaguirre 2004). The
steep decline in overall investments since 1997 has
been arguably a consequence of both the continued
lack of deeper economic reforms, often beyond just
the infrastructure sectors, as well as the deteriorat-
ing market environment for private financing of
infrastructure assets. The Argentina crisis, the
Enron debacle and its impact on investor confi-
dence, together with developments in developed
financial markets,such as a sharp drop in equity val-
uations, widening credit spreads and a withdrawal
from banks in response to increasing loss provisions,
provided a hostile external environment for emerg-
ing market financing over the last few years.
Promises, perils and tradeoffs 
Just a few years ago, privatisation was heralded as
the elixir that would transform ailing and lethargic
state-owned enterprises into sources of creative
productivity and dynamism for the public interest.
National leaders burdened by sizeable budget
deficits and stagnating economies were outspoken
on the need to foster private initiative as a means
of promoting growth and prosperity and enhancing
the economic opportunities of all citizens. Multi-
lateral institutions offered advice and added stim-
ulus to this movement among their national recip-
ients of aid. The world-wide press provided a near
harmony of voices in praise of the new trend in
policy thinking (Willig 1994).
However, as with all economic elixirs, privatisation
was oversimplified, oversold and ultimately disap-
pointing in delivering less than promised. Recently,
the alleged “failures” of privatisation, improper re-
structuring, and too rapid regulatory decontrol,
have led to street riots, sceptical press coverage and
mounting criticism of multilateral institutions.
Today, privatisation is undergoing a multifaceted
revisionism and its critics are numerous and vocal.
This hostility is not limited to a few radical protest-
ers. Opinion polls in several DTEs, especially in
Latin America,reveal growing public dissatisfaction
and disenchantment with privatisation. The disap-
proval ratings in 2002 were higher than in 2000, and
the latter were higher than in 1998. In 2002, almost
90 percent of the Argentines and 80 percent of the
Chileans polled disapproved of the privatisation
process even though there were demonstrable per-
formance improvements (Figure 2).
At the same time, however, many of privatisation’s
current critics are unduly impatient and suffer from
a measure of illusion and misunderstanding. One of
the distinguishing characteristics of most DTEs was
the extraordinarily low level of objective perfor-
mance in their infrastructure sectors compared to
the equivalent sectors of advanced industrial eco-
nomies.However,the structure of ownership was not
necessarily the key explanatory variable for the ob-
served differential in performance. After all, during
the same period state ownership in these sectors was
also prevalent in most developed economies where
performance was reasonably good. The deeper ex-
planation arguably lies elsewhere.
It can be plausibly argued that the performance of
the state-owned network utilities has been an accu-
rate summary statistic of a variety of country-spe-
cific observable and unobservable characteristics
(institutional development, nature of organised in-
terest groups and patterns of social conflict, busi-
ness culture and code of conduct, etc.). It would be
utterly unrealistic to expect that these characteris-
tics would change on a time scale comparable to
that of executing privatisation transactions, or that
their less prepossessing attributes would disappear
overnight. Even in the advanced industrial econo-
Figure 2mies it took a long time for their institutions to
develop.It would be difficult to create such institu-
tions overnight in societies that do not have the
supporting constitutional, political and legal tradi-
tions, or infrastructure to support them. Thus,
achieving the public interest objectives of privati-
sation is likely to require a longer time period than
that which has elapsed since the reforms were
introduced in the majority of the DTEs. It should
be noted that several decades were required in the
“miracle economies” of the Far East before the
invested effort began to produce any noticeable
results (Baumol 1993).
Disappointment has been engendered by the price
increases and reductions in jobs that often accom-
pany infrastructure reforms, as well as by the high
profits of the firms that are successful in improving
physical operating performance, an outcome that
has occurred in most cases. However, it is important
to note that one of the key problems of the old util-
ity model was underinvestment, in large part caused
by underpricing. The state-owned utilities were
hopeless at attributing the right cost of capital, par-
ticularly during periods of high inflation, so prices
often fell to levels that could not sustain a rate of
investment out of retained profits to meet demand
growth. Government subsidies simply perpetuated
the problem until the fiscal crunch occurred. The
choice was either more taxation or higher prices.
The latter would generally fall on those who benefit
from existing services – the middle class and richer
consumers – while the former was likely to be felt
partly via inflation taxes which hit the poor,or other
groups without protective assets. A sensible, and
arguably less regressive, response was to realign
prices with underlying costs. Thus, the fact that pri-
vatisation renders such price adjustments mandato-
ry before investors are willing to invest is actually
one of its main attractions.
In the pre-reform era,the operations of state-owned
utilities in most DTEs were characterised by
extremely high levels of excess employment.
Efficiency and competitiveness, on the other hand,
require the elimination of redundant jobs.Restoring
efficiency is especially important in the infrastruc-
ture sectors because they provide services that are
critical inputs in manufacturing, transportation and
commerce – services that are essential to boosting
economic activity and increasing competition
through the expansion of product lines and geo-
graphic spheres of distribution.Therefore, failure to
improve efficiency in these sectors risks their
becoming a serious burden on the economy in gen-
eral and on the evolution of competitive markets in
particular. Moreover, the market’s key incentive
mechanism is founded upon the prospect of profits
for those firms that succeed.Thus, while prevention
of monopoly profits is a legitimate public policy
goal, it should not lead to artificial limits on post-
privatisation profits or restrict such profits on the
basis of mechanistic formulas or populist demands.
Otherwise, the incentives for investment, efficiency,
productive growth and innovation – badly needed in
the network utilities of most DTEs – would be
undermined or eliminated.
Efficiency impacts of privatisation and liberalisation
The future course of privatisation and regulatory
reform in the DTEs will be determined not only by
the prevailing economic and political philosophies,
and macroeconomic conditions,but also by the col-
lective assessment of the record so far.A review of
the evidence suggests that while there have been
disappointments, there have been substantial gains
that are not always obvious. However, seeing a
clear picture of results is difficult because the per-
formance of each network utility is multi-faceted,
and different observers may weigh various aspects
of performance differently. It is even less possible
to reach an unequivocal verdict about the effects
of privatisation and regulatory reform on the
diverse collection of network utilities and coun-
tries that have experienced them in varying ways
and degrees – these industries and countries are
just plain different and should not be lumped into
a single cookie cutter reform model.Assessment is
further complicated by the very short time span of
privatisation, restructuring and major regulatory
reforms in the majority of DTEs; by the severe
measurement problems with respect to important
economic variables; and by the fact that privatiza-
tion and regulatory reform were implemented
simultaneously, so it is virtually impossible to
econometrically identify their separate effects.
Only in the United States, where the structure of
ownership remained constant, can changes in per-
formance be confidently traced to changes in the
regulatory regime.
All of the above measurement difficulties notwith-
standing, most of the empirical evaluations of pri-
vatisation and restructuring seem to be favourable
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(Gray 2001, Megginson and Netter 2001). At the
microeconomic level, the emerging empirical evi-
dence provides support to the view that privatisa-
tion has positive effects on efficiency (labour and
total factor productivity), financial performance of
utilities and service expansion. This empirical sup-
port is derived from a variety of studies that
analyse the pre- and post-privatisation perfor-
mance of specific firms, a cross-section of firms
from different industries within a given country
and a cross-section of firms from different coun-
tries (Galal et al. 1994, Bourbakri and Cosset 1998,
Dewenter and Malatesta 2001, Sheshinski and
Lopez-Calva 2000, Delfino and Casarin 2001).
Reforms have expedited service expansion in a
variety of sectors and countries. Telecommunica-
tions coverage has seen the largest jump, but signif-
icant increases have also occurred in electricity,
transportation and access to safe water (Harris
2003).The size of such changes depends enormous-
ly on the extent to which the market is liberalized
and the effectiveness of regulation. For example,
increased competition has been particularly power-
ful in boosting telecommunications coverage.
Networks have expanded almost twice as quickly in
Latin American countries that have allowed com-
petition in telecommunications after privatisation
as in countries that simply converted to private
monopolies. But even private monopolies have
expanded faster than public ones (Figure 3).
Privatisation and deregulation have significantly
improved physical performance, service quality
and other aspects of efficiency in many developing
and transition economies. Railroad privatisation
has led to spectacular gains in labour productivity
(Thompson 2003). For example, in many Latin
American rail systems output per employee (mea-
sured as the sum of ton-kilometres and passenger-
kilometres) has doubled, tripled, or even quadru-
pled after privatisation (Thompson and Budin
2001). Reforms have also led to significant
improvements in the operating performance of
ports. Privatisation generated significant efficiency
gains in the operations of Kelang Port Authority,
Malaysia’s largest port (Peters 1995). Crane han-
dling improved from 19.4 containers an hour in
1985 to 27.3 in 1987, bringing Kelang’s perfor-
mance close to Singapore’s (Tull and Reveley
2001). The return on fixed assets grew at an aver-
age annual compound rate of just 1.9 percent in
1981–86, but jumped to 11.6 percent in 1986–90, a
result of improvements in productivity and
throughput, not higher prices. Workers also bene-
fited from the gains in productivity: by 1990 they
were paid 60 percent more an hour in real terms,
put in 6 percent more hours and produced 76 per-
cent more than before privatisation (Galal and
others 1994).
Reforms have had remarkable effects on the quali-
ty of electricity supply. In Chile the average time
for emergency repair service declined from 5 hours
in 1988 to 2 hours in 1994. In addition, power out-
ages due to transmission failures have fallen steadi-
ly since privatisation (Rudnick and Zolezzi 2001).
Energy losses, including theft, have also shrunk,
from 21 percent in 1986 to 9 percent in 1996
(Fischer and Serra 2000). In Argentina, Edenor’s
losses fell from 26 percent of its distributed elec-
tricity in 1993 to just 10 percent in 2000. In the
greater Buenos Aires area the hours of supply lost
per year dropped from 16.8 in 1994 to 5.0 in 2001.
Technical losses in transmission
also fell, from 6 percent in 1992
to 4 percent in 2000.
Before reforms, the failure of
many governments to adequate-
ly increase service rates, espe-
cially during periods of high in-
flation, effectively decapitalised
their infrastructure systems. In
the past few years,many countries
have begun dismantling long-
standing policies of underpricing
and cross-subsidies. Electricity
reforms have better aligned prices
with underlying costs to reflect
Figure 3resource scarcity, as efficiency requires. In many
countries this has meant increasing prices that pre-
viously were too low (Joskow 2003). But in some
countries prices have been falling because of the
efficient exploitation of regional natural gas net-
works and new production technologies (mainly
combined-cycle gas turbines). In Argentina the
average monthly price per megawatt-hour in the
wholesale electricity market fell from about $45
(with peaks of more than $70) in 1992 to about $15
in 2001. Similarly, in Chile the node price (includ-
ing energy and capacity charges) of power deliv-
ered to Santiago fell from $30 per megawatt-hour
in October 1982 to $23 per megawatt-hour in
October 2002 (in October 2002 dollars; Pollitt
2003). Between 1986 and 1996 wholesale prices
dropped 37 percent and final prices fell 17 percent.
Post-reform pricing in several developing and tran-
sition economies has provided considerable bene-
fits to rail users. Among 17 privatised railroads
(mostly in Latin America), 15 had lower freight
tariffs in 1999 than when the concessions started
(mostly in the mid-1990s).Rates dropped 8–54 per-
cent in Latin America and 14 percent in Côte
d’Ivoire. For the six countries involved these tariff
reductions saved about $1 billion a year in trans-
port costs (Thompson, Budin and Estache 2001).
Moreover,these estimates understate the total sav-
ings because they do not reflect the competitive
pressures that lower rail tariffs exerted on trucking
and other competing transport modes.
Effects on distributional equity
To mitigate the public discontent associated with
restructuring and privatisation, more comprehensive
assessments are needed of their welfare effects –
moving beyond standard analyses of their impacts on
firm profitability and industry performance to
include their effects on workers and households at
different income levels. Moreover, distinctions
between low- and middle-income countries need to
be made more carefully. In low-income countries
nearly all rural and many poor urban residents lack
access to basic infrastructure services. Thus the poli-
cy reforms that normally accompany restructuring
and privatisation – such as eliminating cross-subsi-
dies and moving toward cost-reflective prices – main-
ly affect higher-income groups.But in middle-income
countries – such as those in Latin America and espe-
cially transition economies – such reforms can hurt
poor people because many of them (mainly in urban
areas) have access to basic services. The solution is
not to halt the needed reforms but to put in place
safety nets and tariff rebalancing schemes that do not
involve radical, across-the-board price increases.
Recent empirical work offers insights on the distri-
butional effects of infrastructure reforms. Studies
in Argentina, for example, have found that all
income classes benefited from the efficiency, qual-
ity and access improvements resulting from the
utility privatisation that began in 1990. More effi-
cient infrastructure services also affect most other
economic activities and promote general economic
growth – enhancing economic opportunities for
poor people. When these general effects are taken
into account, the poorest groups seem to benefit
the most from the increased productivity and
access brought about by privatisation and related
reforms (Benitez, Chisari and Estache 2003).
Recent research analysing the welfare effects of
utility privatisation in four Latin American coun-
tries (Argentina, Bolivia, Mexico and Nicaragua)
found no clear pattern in price changes – in about
half the cases, prices fell. But there were adverse
distributional effects on the bottom half of the
income distribution due to job cuts in the privatised
utilities. Against these negative distributional
effects of layoffs have to be offset the improve-
ments in service quality, increased access for poor
people and the changed structure of public finances,
which benefited poor people more than other
income groups (McKenzie and Mookherjee 2003).
Agenda for further policy analysis
There is compelling evidence that restructuring
and privatisation, when designed and implemented
well, can significantly improve infrastructure per-
formance. Still, critics of reform are right to point
out the many cases where privatisation has been
undertaken without institutional safeguards and
conducted in ways widely viewed as illegitimate.
Under those circumstances transferring state
assets to private control may have been a dubious
achievement (Stiglitz 1999). Moreover, concerns
are growing about the distributional effects of pri-
vatisation and market liberalisation – especially
their effects on basic services for poor households
and other disadvantaged groups.
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Thus there is an urgent need to analyse the suc-
cesses and failures associated with past reforms
and to identify the instruments and policies that
should guide ongoing and future efforts. Such an
agenda should focus on the efficiency and distribu-
tional effects of restructuring and privatisation
programs and on several second generation regula-
tory reforms – of pricing,access to bottleneck facil-
ities, and subsidies – that will be needed if such
programs are to achieve their public interest goals.
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